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Introduction 
Under normal economic conditions, the Federal Reserve has the responsibility for 
conducting the nation’s monetary policy. By controlling the availability and cost of money, 
the Fed tries to achieve the two goals of maintaining high levels of employment and low 
inflation. When institutions face liquidity crises, with a lack of cash and a perception of 
mistrust in the market, the central bank may act as a “lender of last resort” and provide 
emergency credit through its discount window operations. 
The events of the last year and a half have prompted the Federal Reserve to respond in 
unique and unconventional ways: establishing currency swap lines with foreign central banks, 
buying mortgage-backed securities directly, providing liquidity to certain markets, and 
financing the merger of individual financial institutions. Chairman Ben Bernanke has 
overseen this aggressive expansion of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy toolkit. He 
classifies the Fed’s actions into three separate categories – (1) short-term lending to financial 
institutions, (2) providing liquidity to key markets, and (3) buying longer-term securities from 
the government sponsored entities.1 A fourth category, not mentioned by the Fed Chairman, 
would be participating in the rescues and mergers of individual financial firms. In the past 
year and a half, the Federal Reserve has responded in these ways to changing economic 
conditions and emerging crises in financial markets. 
In late 2007, as the imminent collapse of the housing bubble became apparent, the Federal 
Reserve created the first of many liquidity facilities, the Term Auction Facility, to lend to 
depository institutions. For a while, the TAF remained the only special facility beyond the 
Fed’s discount window. With the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the Fed attempted 
to calm financial markets with two facilities designed for short-term borrowing at investment 
banks, as well as a special purpose vehicle to facilitate the takeover of Bear Stearns by JP 
Morgan Chase. 
These efforts were relatively small compared with the explosion in activity during the 
months of September and October in 2008. The Federal Reserve agreed to purchase debt 
from the government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and provided an 
emergency credit line to the failing insurance company American International Group. The 
watershed event that altered the economic landscape, sparking panic and uncertainty, was 
the bankruptcy filing of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. With 
institutions collapsing and the stock market tanking, the Federal Reserve expanded eligibility 
at the liquidity facilities designed for investment banks and created two more facilities 
designed to provide liquidity directly to money markets. Since then, the most recent addition 
to the Fed’s toolkit, a joint venture with the Treasury, has garnered less participation from 
financial institutions.  
Taken together, the Federal Reserve’s actions through its special lending facilities have 
resulted in a massive expansion of its balance sheet, increasing its total assets from $900 
                                                 
1 Bernanke, Ben S., “The Crisis and the Policy Response,” Speech at the Stamp Lecture, London School of 
Economics, January 13, 2009.    
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm  
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billion to $2.1 trillion in the past year.2 This massive sum of money is much larger than the 
federal stimulus package authorized by President Barack Obama and nearly twice as large as 
the bank bailout initiated by former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Yet, the Federal 
Reserve’s actions have received scant public scrutiny relative to these other government 
measures. Because the Fed only publishes aggregate data, it is impossible to tell exactly 
which firms are borrowing from its liquidity facilities, and just how much. Recently, the 
Federal Reserve has made modifications that reduce the potential liabilities of some of its 
lending facilities, but these relatively minor changes have virtually zero effect on the actual 
balance sheet of the central bank. 
In this paper, we analyze the trends in activity at the Federal Reserve’s special lending 
facilities, hoping to provide a better understanding of their operation and significance within 
financial markets. We look at each of these facilities individually in order to provide a clearer 
picture of the trends in activity, the decision-making process at the Fed, as well as the 
interaction between these special facilities and financial markets more generally. We examine 
the special liquidity facilities in order of relative significance, going from largest to smallest, 
in terms of total value outstanding. 
 
                                                 
2 “Recent Balance Sheet Trends,” Federal Reserve: Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, June 
5, 2009. http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm  
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Descriptions of Individual Liquidity Facilities 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) 
The first special liquidity facility to be announced by the Federal Reserve was the Term 
Auction Facility. Since its creation in December 2007, the TAF has consistently held more in 
total funds outstanding than any other facility, as shown in Figure 1. Through the TAF, the 
Federal Reserve holds biweekly auctions to provide short-term liquidity for depository 
institutions, especially commercial banks. Banks are often reluctant to borrow from the 
Federal Reserve because investors and depositors can perceive it as a sign of weakness. In 
order to overcome this “stigma,” the Fed explicitly structured and advertised the TAF for 
institutions judged to be in sound financial condition. 
FIGURE 1 
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Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
 
The borrowing terms at the TAF are very similar to the central bank’s discount window, 
with similar collateral requirements and loan terms of either 28 or 84 days. The auction 
structure, with its fluctuating bid prices, means that in some cases the Federal Reserve may 
provide credit at rates lower than what banks would normally pay at the discount window. 
This fact, as well as the lack of full disclosure regarding how much individual institutions 
borrow, have made the TAF an attractive source of credit for depository institutions. 
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Initially, the Fed placed a maximum of $20 billion on each auction, and total participation 
remained below $100 billion. In May 2008, the Fed announced plans to raise the value of 
TAF auctions from $50 billion to $75 billion. For the next five months, the facility held $150 
billion in total funds outstanding. Then, after a tumultuous September, the Fed announced 
that the sizes of both 24-day and 84-day auctions would be boosted to $150 billion each, 
creating the potential for $600 billion worth of lending. In actuality, the total outstanding 
value at the TAF has fluctuated around $400 billion, peaking at $490 billion in March and 
falling under $400 billion in June 2009. Since then, the Fed has scaled back the size of TAF 
auctions slightly (see Figure 2), reducing the maximum total outstanding from $600 billion to 
$500 billion (see Figure 2). These values make the TAF the largest liquidity facility that the 
Federal Reserve has created in the last year and a half. 
FIGURE 2 










































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
 
 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
The second largest liquidity facility, announced in October 2008 just after Congress 
approved the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), was designed to provide liquidity for 
the commercial paper market. Commercial paper is the debt that institutions use to fund 
everyday operating expenses, such as payroll. During the financial crisis, money market 
mutual funds and other regular buyers of commercial paper had become reluctant to 
purchase any unsecured debt in money markets, and the volume of outstanding loans 
shrank. 
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In response, the Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility to provide 
a liquidity backstop for issuers of commercial paper. Through the CPFF, the Federal Reserve 
finances a special purpose vehicle that purchases three-month unsecured and asset-backed 
commercial paper from eligible issuers. Participating institutions pledge the commercial 
paper as collateral in exchange for funds, while the Fed holds the debt to maturity. The 
facility effectively eliminates any risk that issuers would not be able to roll over their 
maturing commercial paper. The interest rate on borrowing is priced according to an 
overnight index swap rate, plus a fixed premium. 
In the first several months of operation, the facility became a significant player in the 
commercial paper market. In January 2009, the CPFF’s total outstanding value peaked at 
$350 billion in a market estimated around $1.5 trillion in size. At the end of January, about 
$245 billion of commercial paper initially sold to the Fed was set to mature. Private investors 
were able to purchase a significant portion of the debt, and the total outstanding at the 
CPFF decreased by nearly $100 billion. Three months later, at the end of April, the Fed 
resold much of its commercial paper holdings in the market again, and the value of the 
CPFF decreased sharply. As of July 2009, the CPFF had fallen to $120 billion in total 
outstanding value. The steady decline is an indication that institutions are becoming less 
reliant on the Fed’s backstop in the commercial paper market (see Figure 3). 
FIGURE 3 












































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
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Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) 
The Term Securities Lending Facility is designed for financial institutions registered with the 
Fed as primary dealers, including some of the world’s largest investment banks. Announced 
in March 2008, the TSLF allows these institutions to exchange a variety of securities for 
Treasuries, which are seen as safe and reliable instruments in financial markets. The bond-
for-bond exchange typically matures after one month. The facility operates under an auction 
format, similar to the TAF. There are two types of auctions at the TSLF, Schedule I and 
Schedule II, which are held on an alternating biweekly basis. Schedule II auctions have more 
lenient collateral requirements, allowing banks to pledge certain asset-backed and mortgage-
backed securities not accepted at Schedule I auctions. This greater flexibility has made 
Schedule II auctions consistently more popular throughout the financial crisis. 
The TSLF has been quite active ever since its inception. In March 2008, the facility’s first 
month in operation, its total value outstanding reached nearly $160 billion. Participation 
decreased slightly in the following months but increased dramatically during September and 
October of 2008. In response to the upheaval in financial markets after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers, the Federal Reserve broadened the set of eligible collateral at the TSLF to include 
a wide variety of corporate, municipal, asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities. The 
TSLF reached $230 billion in total outstanding value as broker dealers sought after the safe 
Treasury securities offered by the facility. The total outstanding remained above $150 billion 
through the end of 2008, but has tapered off significantly since then, falling under $10 billion 
in June 2009 (see Figure 4). Responding to the decrease in demand, the Federal Reserve 
announced plans to conduct TSLF auctions monthly instead of biweekly, decreasing the 
maximum potential outstanding from $200 billion to $75 billion. 
FIGURE 4 









































































































Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, TSLF Operations and author’s analysis 
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Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) 
The Primary Dealer Credit Facility was also designed for investment banks. Announced in 
March 2008, the facility provides overnight loans on a daily basis to foster short-term 
borrowing between institutions. It is through overnight markets that banks make daily 
capital adjustments to balance out their books, so insuring against the risk of liquidity freezes 
was a high priority for the Fed. The interest rate on loans through the PDCF is equivalent to 
the primary credit rate, currently 50 basis points. 
Participation at the PDCF has experienced two distinct peaks in activity, coinciding with an 
expansion in eligibility. In late March and early April of 2008, after the collapse of Bear 
Stearns, the total volume outstanding approached $40 billion. After this period of increased 
activity, borrowing tailed off at the PDCF, approaching zero in June 2008. The lull in activity 
did not last long, however. In mid-September, amid growing concerns surrounding the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers, the Federal Reserve agreed to make it easier for 
institutions to participate in the PDCF. With fears of a “broad run on the U.S. financial 
system,” the Fed agreed to accept as collateral the same set of securities used in open market 
trading, including stocks and other debt securities.3 The change allowed the total outstanding 
at the PDCF to reach extraordinary heights in September and October. The total 
outstanding value of the facility reached almost $150 billion. Since then, borrowing has 
declined steadily, eventually returning back to zero in May 2009, as demand for the facility 
curtailed (see Figure 5). 
                                                 
3 Torres, Craig and Liz Capo McCormick, “Fed Widens Collateral, Banks Set Up $70 Billion Fund,” 
Bloomberg, September 15, 2008. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=aDtOgpksgeIA  
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FIGURE 5 












































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
 
 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility 
(AMLF) 
In an effort to further bolster money markets, the Federal Reserve created the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility to finance the purchase of asset-
backed commercial paper from money market mutual funds. Announced in September 2008, 
the AMLF allows depository institutions and bank holding companies to borrow funds from 
the Fed in exchange for highly-rated asset-backed commercial paper. The term of the loans 
is typically two weeks or less, and they carry an interest rate equivalent to the primary credit 
rate offered by the Boston Federal Reserve, currently 50 basis points. 
Like the PDCF and the TSLF, participation in the special lending facility has fluctuated with 
levels of strain in the financial markets. Created shortly after the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, participation at the AMLF peaked in its first month of operation, reaching a 
total value outstanding of $140 billion. After the initial burst in activity, lending tailed off 
dramatically, dipping below $1 billion in April 2009. 
In the month of May, activity at the AMLF experienced an unexpected uptick. The Federal 
Reserve had announced it would exclude commercial paper facing a downgrade from the 
facility. At the same time, several ratings firms announced that certain major financial 
institutions would be facing downgrades in the future. Taken together, the two events 
sparked a massive sell off as investors looked to unload their debt before it received a 
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downgrade. Total outstanding at the AMLF increased by nearly $30 billion, as shown in 
Figure 6. Some have referred to the episode as “market paranoia,” but it serves to 
demonstrate the extreme sensitivity in financial markets currently.4 
FIGURE 6 













































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
 
 
AIG Credit Line 
Beyond providing liquidity to certain institutions and markets, the Federal Reserve has also 
been involved in the rescue of individual firms. In September 2008, the Federal Reserve 
participated in the rescue of the failing insurance company, American International Group. 
The Federal Reserve provided AIG with an $85 billion line of credit in exchange for a 79.9% 
equity stake in what was once the world’s largest insurer. In November, the Fed’s financial 
support for AIG was restructured when two limited liability corporations were created to 
purchase specific assets from AIG. The Maiden Lane facilities will be covered in-depth in 
the next section, but their creation meant that the value of the Federal Reserve’s direct credit 
extension to AIG declined from $85 billion in November 2008 to $40 billion in December 
2008 (see Figure 7). 
                                                 
4 Shrivastava, Anusha, “Investors Sell Short-Term Bank Debt,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2009. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124174505166899205.html  
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FIGURE 7 





















































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
 
 
Maiden Lane Facilities  
As mentioned above, the Federal Reserve has participated in the rescue of individual firms 
during the financial crisis, namely American International Group and Bear Stearns. The 
actions have stretched the legal limits of the central bank’s authority, because by law, the Fed 
is not allowed to lend on an unsecured basis or purchase assets other than Treasuries and 
agency-backed mortgage securities from banks. In order to facilitate the rescue and 
resolution of AIG and Bear Stearns within legal limits, the Federal Reserve created three 
limited liability corporations in the last year. The Maiden Lane facilities, named after the 
street in Manhattan where the New York Fed is located, borrow from the Fed and then 
purchase assets from the failing institutions. These “structured purpose vehicles” still exist 
on the Fed’s balance sheet, but they appear as loans instead of asset purchases. 
The first of such facilities, Maiden Lane I, was created in March 2008 to facilitate the 
takeover of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase & Co. The New York Fed made nearly $30 
billion available to Maiden Lane, with JP Morgan providing a smaller supplemental loan. The 
total outstanding on the loan has declined incrementally to around $25 billion in July 2009 
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(see Figure 8). The Fed has already reported $3.1 billion in losses related to the Bear Stearns 
deal.5 
 
The Federal Reserve also created two additional Maiden Lane facilities in an effort to 
restructure its financial support for AIG. The Federal Reserve would finance the purchase of 
mortgage-backed securities through Maiden Lane II and the purchase of collateralized debt 
obligations through Maiden Lane III. Initially, Maiden Lane II borrowed nearly $20 billion, 
and Maiden Lane III borrowed nearly $25 billion from the Fed. AIG made quick use of the 
financial support from the central bank. In March 2009, AIG, in conjunction with its Maiden 
Lane facilities, agreed to settle $62 billion worth of derivatives contracts with 16 investment 
banks. Among others, the French-owned Societe Generale received $16.4 billion, and 
Goldman Sachs received $14 billion.6 In May 2009, after AIG’s first quarter earnings reports 
were made public, holdings under Maiden Lane II and III decreased by $2 billion and $6 
billion, respectively (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). 
                                                 
5 Krasny, Ros, “Fed Data Shows Big Losses on Bear Stearns Deal,” Reuters, April 23, 2009. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE53M5TO20090423.  
6 Murti, Bhattiprolu, “AIG, Maiden Lane Will Pay $62 Billion to Settle Derivatives,” Wall Street Journal. March 
17, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123732426239261613.html.  
FIGURE 8 











































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 













































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
FIGURE 10 










































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
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Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
The most recent addition to the Federal Reserve’s “alphabet soup” of liquidity facilities was 
announced in November 2008. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility is designed 
to support the issuance of asset-backed securities. The Federal Reserve provides loans for a 
term of three years in exchange for highly-rated and newly-issued asset-backed securities. 
The facility especially focuses on securities backed by consumer products, including student 
loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans to small businesses. 
For three months after its initial announcement, the TALF was completely inactive. The 
facility did not begin operating until March 2008. The Federal Reserve, in conjunction with 
the Treasury, announced plans to broaden the authority of the TALF to participate in 
markets for consumer debt. Officials indicated that the facility could expand up to $1 trillion 
in loans. The actual participation at the TALF, however, fell far short of expectations. 
Activity stood at $25 billion as of July 2009, making it smaller than any other special liquidity 
facility (see Figure 11). Investors, it seemed, had become much more hesitant to utilize 
sources of public financing, even on such favorable terms. 
 
In March 2008, the Treasury Department announced an ambitious plan to facilitate the 
purchase of mortgage-backed securities and establish fair prices in markets that had become 
clogged during the crisis. The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), as envisioned by 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, would extend subsidized credit and provide loss 
guarantees in order to induce private investors to buy up the bad assets that banks held. The 
FIGURE 11 











































































































Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
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Fed would broaden the collateral requirements of the TALF to include older mortgage-
backed securities that still remain on and off the balance sheets of banks. In a separate part 
of the program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) would guarantee the 
purchase of other debt using a leverage ratio of six to one. 
After the experience of the TALF, many worried the government plan would receive a 
lukewarm response from investors. The plan was also criticized for being vulnerable to self-
dealing on the part of banks. Treasury officials have signaled the program will begin soon, 
but officials from the Federal Reserve have backpedaled on their commitment to purchasing 
older mortgage-backed securities. It is still uncertain what form the PPIP will take, but its 
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Conclusion 
The special liquidity facilities created by the Federal Reserve in response to the financial 
crisis have expanded its balance sheet by over $1 trillion in terms of total assets. This sum is 
larger than the total price tag of the federal stimulus package passed under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) as well as the bank bailout authorized by the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Yet, both of these government responses have 
received enormously more public scrutiny than any of the actions taken by the Federal 
Reserve. 
The standards of transparency for the Federal Reserve facilities are significantly more lax 
than the other federal programs, especially the stimulus, which were subject to near full 
disclosure. Under both the ARRA and the TARP, the public has access to information about 
which firms and agencies receive money from the government and under what terms. 
Oversight panels were established to report on the current status, and perceived problems, 
of these efforts. By contrast, when it comes to the Federal Reserve’s special liquidity 
facilities, there is still almost no information available about who has benefited from these 
programs. 
 
